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When Is Initiative Lawmaking Not
"Republican Government"?
By HANS A.

LINDE*

It is welcome to see scholarly attention turn once again to the constitutional position of direct legislation.1 Because legislation by a majority of votes cast on an initiative petition bypasses safeguards found in
lawmaking by representatives and in the governor's veto, Professor
Eule's address in this symposium proposes to confine the anomaly by
more rigorous judicial review.2 The question is, review for what
shortcomings?
Two developments may explain the scholars' renewed interest. One
is the high national visibility of recent initiative measures, particularly in
California, such as tax limitations, bans against nondiscriminatory housing laws, the death penalty, the official entrenchment of the English language, and liability insurance laws. Second, a new academic generation
has taken to debating the philosophical theory of legislation: Must
lawmakers have broader aims than the self-interest of particular persons
or groups? That is a question of political philosophy. The answer becomes a legal test of lawmaking only if it can be translated into a constitutional requirement. If it is a requirement, what are the implications for
direct lawmaking by popular initiative?
The philosophical discussion contrasts an interest group model of
making public choices3 with a theory using combinations of the words
"civic," "virtue," and "republican"-civic republicanism, or simply republicanism for our purposes. This theory postulates that a civil society
of equals allows the coercive power of government only for ends that can
*

Justice, Supreme Court of Oregon.

1. See, ag., W. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
(1972); Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV,Section 4: A Study in Constitutional

Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REv. 513 (1962); Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation,and Collective
Action in Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REv. 930 (1988); Heaton, The Guarantee
Clause: A Role for the Courts, 16 CUMB. L. REv. 47 (1985); Merritt, The Guarantee Clause
and State Automony: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1988); Sirico, The
Constitutionalityof the Initiative and Referendum, 65 IOWA L. REv. 637 (1980).
2. Eule, Checking California'sPlebiscite, 17 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 151 (1989); see also
Eule, JudicialReview of DirectDemocracy, 99 YALE L.J. - (1990).

3. See, ag., Symposium on The Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988).
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fairly be said to extend beyond the private interests or passions of those
who control that power. Its proponents find sufficient historical support
to describe civic republicanism as part of our constitutional tradition,
which is only a short step from enforcing the traditon as higher law to set
aside legislation-somewhat like the other, more individualistic, tradition of unwritten "natural rights." 4 Of the two, civic republicanism is
the more interesting theory if it can bridge the gap between two visions of
judicial review: process-focused review, which its critics find too sterile
and too permissive toward political power, and free-wheeling review of
the substance of laws independent of any constraints found in the
Constitution.
In our recent bicentennial reexamination of the Constitution, some
have rediscovered one clause that expressly entrenches the concept of
republicanism: the clause of Article IV, section 4, that directs the United
States to guarantee to every state a republican form of government.
What theory does it enshrine?
Ruling on Republicanism
The Supreme Court early declined to examine what the Constitution
means by a "republican form of government," holding that a fight between two groups claiming to be the government of Rhode Island had to
be settled by the national political branches.' In 1912 the Court refused
to. decide the very different question whether a republican government
could bypass representative institutions altogether and make laws without participation of the legislature or the governor, thus turning aside a
telephone company's attack on an Oregon tax placed on the ballot by
petition and enacted by a majority of those voting on the measure.' The
4. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988) [hereinafter Beyond the Revival]; Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29
(1985) [hereinafter Interest Groups]. The growing literature on civic republicanism includes
the following: J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); Fallon, What is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989); Fallon, A Constructivist
Coherence Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987); Fitts, The
Vices of Virtue: A PoliticalParty Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process,
136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1988); Horwitz, Republicanism andLiberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1987); Kramnick, The "GreatNational Discussion": The Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1988); Michelman, Law's
Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword:
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Nedelsky, Confining Democratic
Politics: Anti-Federalists,Federalists,and the Constitution (Book Review), 96 HARv. L. REV.
340 (1982); Simon, The New Republicanism: Generosity of Spirit in Search of Something To
Say, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 83 (1987).
5. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
6. Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
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Court stuck with that refusal to interpret the guarantee of republican
government in 1962, preferring to review unequal legislative districts as a
denial of equal protection of the laws.7
There has been academic criticism of the Supreme Court's position,8
but we need not pursue that here. More importantly, it is a fallacy to
assume that because the Supreme Court does not interpret the guarantee,
no other courts can or should do so. That is a non sequitur. The Court's
doctrine allocates federal responsibility for the guarantee within the
branches of the federal government, but it does not relieve the states of
the obligation to maintain republican forms of government. A valid act
of Congress under the Guarantee Clause would be the supreme law of
the land, but so is the clause itself, binding the judges in every state. 9
"The guaranty necessarily implies a duty on the part of the States themselves to provide such a government." 10 A state's attorney general, asked
to rule whether a proposal complies with the Guarantee Clause, cannot
cite nonjusticiability as an answer. The Supreme Court's stance perhaps
frees some state courts to send litigants complaining of unrepublican
state acts to their friendly senators or representatives, but it can not compel them to do so. The state court's response depends on the judicial
power within the state, not on the role of the federal judiciary. In many
states, for instance, the justices are called upon for advisory opinions, a
duty that cannot be avoided whenever a constitutional question has not
been answered by the Supreme Court. Even less should it be avoided
when present rights depend on the legitimacy of governmental acts. "
State courts, in fact, have decided claims of unrepublican state acts
on the merits. The telephone company's challenge to Oregon's tax initiative was one of several in which the Oregon Supreme Court rejected a
general attack on the system of direct legislation.' 2 But there were few
7. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
8. See, ag., Bonfield, supra note 1; Merritt, supra note 1.
9. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.

10. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175 (1874).
11. See, eg., Lipscomb v. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 305 Or. 472, 753 P.2d 939 (1988).
12. Kiernan v. Portland, 57 Or. 454, 112 P. 402 (1910); Straw v. Harris, 54 Or. 424, 103
P. 777 (1909); Oregon v. Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co., 53 Or. 162, 99 P. 427 (1909); Kadderly
v. Portland, 44 Or. 118, 74 P. 710 (1903).
Long before,.the Delaware court had hurled its anathema against a law for local elections
on liquor laws as tending "to subvert our representative republican form of government," but
its decision was based on Delaware's, not on the federal, constitution. Rice v. Foster, 4 Del. (4
Harr.) 479, 499 (1847).
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citations to Article IV, section 4, after the United States Supreme Court
declined to consider claims under the clause, either because lawyers
thought that this also foreclosed such a claim in state courts or because,
bereft of case authority, they did not know how to brief it. Courts dismissed the few citations of the clause without any discussion, except for
one remarkable modem opinion of the Kansas Supreme Court. 13
Kansas had amended its constitution to allow the governor to reorganize or abolish state agencies by executive order subject to disapproval
by either house of the legislature, and the state treasurer attacked this
reversal of functions as contrary to the republican principles required
under the Guarantee Clause. Chief Justice Fatzer, after quoting at
length from James Madison's notes of the constitutional convention and
from his Federalist Nos. 10, 39, 43, and 47, eventually sustained the
amendment because the legislature retained the power to reorganize the
executive branch if it so chose.
Similarly, the Oregon court had turned aside the attack on direct
legislation because it left the conventional institutions of government in
existence. It was "inconceivable," the court said, that a state "loses caste
as a republic" merely because it allows citizens by popular petition and
plebiscite to act as a branch of its legislative department." In short, the
Oregon court considered the question to be whether Oregon's government, regarded as a'static structure, remained republican in form. So did
5
the United States Supreme Court.'
This purely static, formal reading of the Guarantee Clause reflected
not merely literalism but also a lack of actual experience with the new
direct lawmaking. It made the question an abstract all-or-nothing proposition about forms of government. Republics in name that kept impotent
assemblies while transferring lawmaking power to an executive sup13. Van Sickle v. Shanahan, 212 Kan. 426, 511 P.2d 223 (1973); see also Frankenstein v.
Leonard, 134 Ohio St. 251, 16 N.E.2d 424 (1938) (per curiam); Breedlove v. Suttles, 183 Ga.
189, 188 S.E. 140 (1936); Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d
645 (1935).
14. Kiernan, 57 Or. at 474, 112 P. at 405-06; see also Kadderly, 44 Or. at 145, 74 P. at
719-20.
15. Plaintiff's assault "is not on the tax as a tax, but on the State as a State... to demand

of the State that it establish its right to exist as a State, republican in form." Pacific States Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 150-51 (1912); see also Sirico, supra note 1, at 652.
Early commentary also was confined to a structural, all-or-nothing approach without con-

sidering whether some initiatives might and others might not contravene the purposes of the
guarantee of a "republican" form of government. See, e.g., Sherwood, The Initiative and Referendum Under the United States Constitution, 56 CENT. L.J. 247 (1903); Hand, Is the Initia-

tive and Referendum Repugnant to the Constitution of the United States?, 58 CENT. L.J. 244
(1904); Coutts, Is a Provisionfor the Initiative and Referendum Inconsistent With the Constitu-

tion of the United States?, 6 MICH. L. REV. 304 (1908).
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ported by popular plebiscites were far in the antique past; others lay in a

future unforeseen in 1912. But upon further examination, might it matter how the initiative is used? Might some uses be compatible with republicanism and others not? Or would such a distinction inevitably

mean judicial review of substance masquerading as judgments about process? These questions take us back to the theorists of republicanism.
"Republicanism" and "Democracy"
The theorists' issue is whether the Constitution envisages a political
struggle among competing interests or the pursuit of the public interest, a
search for some larger vision of the common good. 16 The answer may
have consequences for the substantive validity of laws or for the lawmaking process. Republicanism may mean scrutiny of the lawmakers' ends
and of the instrumental rationality of laws toward these ends, or it may
mean scrutiny of lawmaking institutions and procedures.
My own view has been that although the United States Constitution
forbids certain goals, purposes, or effects, it does not affirmatively require
state laws to serve worthy substantive ends.' 7 I mean no cynicism about
legislators; on the contrary, in my experience, most have been far more
committed to the idea of serving a public interest than theorists who see
politics as a jungle will admit. I do mean that the Constitution prescribes
neither a politics of farsighted civic virtue nor a politics of immediate
group interests; legislators may follow one model at one place and time
and the other model at other places and times. Most will follow both
models at the same place and time for different issues, seeking to accommodate long-term public needs as far as the agenda of immediate political demands allows. I I The paradigm of those concurrent pursuits is not
16. Some state constitutions in fact address that issue. Georgia's, for instance, asserts that
its government "is instituted only for the good of the whole." GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, par. 1.
For virtually identical language, see also ALA. CONST. art. I, § 35; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 2;
LA. CONST. art. I, § 1; MD. CONST. art. I; Miss. CONST. art. III, § 5; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 1;
MONT. CONST. art. I. § 1; N.H. CONST. art. I; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 2; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2.

17. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB., L. REv. 197 (1976). That lecture did not
say (1) that legislators only count, or should count, private preferences; (2) that courts should
impose "due process" procedures on legislatures beyond enforcing procedures stated in the
respective constitutions and laws; or (3) that judicial review of the instrumental "rationality"
of laws would be impossible if the law required it. Rather, it said that the United States

Constitution does not require instrumental rationality of laws when the goals of such laws are
neither prescribed nor forbidden.
18. This is not, of course, a sharp distinction. Congress, over Madison's protests,
designed taxes from the beginning with an eye to their microeconomic effects.
In their very first legislative bill, the members of the House of Representatives created an intractable confrontation between North and South. The bill, offered by Vir-

ginia's James Madison, was intended to quickly provide the new government with
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regulatory lawmaking; the paradigm is taxing and spending. Beyond the
unavoidable budget, the lawmaking agenda is the key test of the theory.19
Not to act at all may sometimes be more irresponsible than whatever
action lawmakers might take, yet few theorists suggest that it is unconsti-

tutional not to agree on changing a law.
If the Constitution does not preach that laws must pass a public

interest test, republicanism places higher demands on institutional safeguards. The two visions of republicanism struggle over the ghost of
James Madison, long acknowledged as the genius of carefully balanced
institutions, for channeling the energies of competing geographic and so-

cial factions into mutually acceptable public acts. Professor Cass Sunstein questions this view of Madison and claims him, along with the

republican label, for a communal as distinct from a pluralist vision of
politics.20 In either view, how does lawmaking by petition and plebiscite

fit into republican theory?
The Federalists distinguished republican government both from
monarchy and from direct democracy. They stood for government by
accountable representatives, government with the consent of the govneeded operating funds. It was a temporary measure, Madison explained; a fuller bill
would be offered later. He proposed low tariffs-five percent on most imports.
Speed was essential. Spring had come, and merchant ships were already arriving in
American ports with the year's shipments. His bill could be enacted within a number
of days. This was not to be.
Thomas Fitzsimons of Pennsylvania was on his feet. He had manufacturers
among his constituents. "I have in contemplation to encourage domestic manufactures by protecting duties," he said. He offered a substitute bill with high protective
tariffs. Madison tried to talk down his parochialism: "We must consider the general
interest of the union as much as the local or state interests." His appeal was useless;
the damage was already done, and new protectionist demands came in a flood.
Northern members wanted high tariffs for their factory owners; Southern members
protested that high tariffs would punish their constituents. North and South all had
goods to protect: shoes, tobacco, iron, hemp, hats, nails, indigo, table salt, linens,
paper, brooms. This became legislative logrolling, a parliamentary art devised long
before and perfected over later years in Congress. This was not all.
The merchants of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and other cities had anticipated this tariff bill and had ordered abroad unusually large quantities of goods.
They rallied now to stall the bill's passage until those goods were safely in warehouses duty-free. This might reek of scandal, but the merchants had friends in Congress. After being passed by the house in early May and by the Senate on June 12,
the bill did not reach President Washington until early July. Even then, it did not
take effect until August 1. The government, starved for funds, lost more than $1
million by the delay.
MacNeil, The First Congress, 1 CONSTITUTION 52, 55 (Summer 1989).
19. Any knowledgeable observer is familiar with the central importance of choosing
which long or short term, general or special concerns win a place on the agenda, and how this
often causes bills to be shaped to fit the jurisdiction of a friendly committee. See, e.g., Riker &
Weingast, ConstitutionalRegulation of Legislative Choice: The PoliticalConsequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L..REv. 373, 386 (1988).
20. Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 4, at 30 n.4.
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erned, not by the governed. "Republican" and "democratic" were not
synonyms. "Popular" government could be either a republic or a pure
democracy; the difference, to Madison, was that "in a democracy, the
people must meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic,
they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents."2
Democracy was the antifederalists' program, reflected, for instance, in
demands that citizens be empowered not only to petition but to instruct
their representatives.2 2 But even radicals like Thomas Paine and the
most democratic state constitution, Pennsylvania's in 1777, relied on representative rather than plebiscitary democracy.2 3 Nor were the wishes of
the majority synonymous with the public good. As Sunstein notes,
Madison thought the problem of faction especially acute in a direct democracy, because "[a] common passion or interest will, in almost every
case, be felt by a majority of the whole" without much regard for the
minority.2 4 The common good would emerge from the deliberations of
properly chosen representatives.2 5
The initiative and referral of laws to popular vote were adopted by
western states a century later in the opposite spirit. In Oregon, the
change followed a breakdown of representative government, after the legislature, which was elected in 1896, divided three ways over its chief
political job of electing a United States Senator, and actually failed to
organize at all. This allowed populists to extract promises of radical
changes from the older parties.2 6 These changes included women's suffrage, direct election of senators, local home rule, and recall of officials
along with the initiative and referendum, all of which eventually were
adopted. This was radicalism directed at institutions and processes, not
at substantive outcomes, but of course it was motivated by substantive
21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 132 (J. Madison) (J. Hamilton ed. 1904).
22. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at 189-94,
372-83 (1969); MASS. CONST. pt. I art. 19 (1780). A proposal to add the right "to instruct
their Representatives" to what became the First Amendment failed in the House of Representatives. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 731-45 (J. Gales ed. 1789), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 199-206 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987); see also OR.CONST. art. I, § 26.
23. See Bessette, DeliberativeDemocracy. The Majority Principlein Republican Government, in How DEMOCRATIC Is THE CONSTITUTION? 102 (R. Goldwin & W. Schambra eds.
1980); see also Berns, Does the Constitution "Secure These Rights"?, in id. at 59, 66 (the antifederalists had to concede that even the states were too large f6r direct democracy).
24. Sunstein, Interest Groups,supra note 4, at 40-41 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at
59-60 (J. Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898)).
25. Id.
26. See J. LA PALOMBARA, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN OREGON: 1938-1948,

at 4-11 (1950); McClintock, Seth Lewelling, William S. U'Ren and the Birth of the Oregon
ProgressiveMovement, 68 OR. HIST. Q. 197, 210-16 (1967); West, Reminiscences and Anecdotes: Mostly About Politics, 51 OR. HIST. Q. 95, 95-107 (1950).
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concerns. The proponents of direct legislation were farmers, debtors, silver Republicans, single taxers, and egalitarian populists, as much as progressive reformers; they demanded these majoritarian structures, not for
abstract reasons, but to gain majoritarian economic goals. Thus, William
Jennings Bryan tried to get the initiative and referendum into the 1896
Democratic platform, where they appeared in 1900. Theodore
Roosevelt, on the other hand, saw direct legislation as a revolt against
corruption of existing institutions.2 7 To the Populists,"5 of course, these
were the same reasons: those institutions' resistance to majority goals and
their protection of the wealthy minority proved the need for radical
change even apart from outright bribery. The obvious reform was simply
to let the people decide for themselves by majority vote.
Why might this be inconsistent with a "republican form of government," or, if not always so, when might it be inconsistent? We need not
debate the imaginary extreme case; a state that abolished its legislature or
left it with no lawmaking function would not have a "republican form of
government." If populist reformers had adopted a constitution in which
all laws, or all taxes and appropriations, could be proposed only by the
governor or by initiative petition and enacted by plebiscite, they would
have exceeded the limits of Article IV, section 4, as understood in early
Oregon cases. It would not save such a scheme, I think, to leave the
legislature only the power to repeal an initiated law. Treat my hypothetical example as one extreme on a spectrum that permits enactment of
some or even most measures by plebiscites bypassing the legislature: If
so, how does republicanism provide criteria for distinguishing permissible from impermissible initiative measures?
"Interest" and "Passion"
The Federalists rejected pure democracy for indirect democracy, or
"republicanism," not only to overcome the problem of geographic scale,
but because they feared public acts derived from motives of "interest" or
"passion." "Interest," of course, meant self-interest, essentially the pursuit of wealth. Non-economic "passions" might be religious or patriotic,
collective emotions of love, fear, or hate toward some group or objectthat is to say, communal rather than atomistic.2 9 May some measures be
27. T. Roosevelt, Rationalism and PopularRule, in THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND
RECALL 52 (W. Munro ed. 1912).
28. "Populists" is capitalized here when it means the party by that name. William
Schneider sees a parallel difference among contemporary Democrats. See Schneider, JFK's
Children: The Class of '74, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 1989, at 35.
29. See Diamond, Decent, Even Though Democratic, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION?, supra note 23, at 28-29.
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invalid if taken by direct plebiscites that would be valid if enacted by
representative bodies?
Consider some examples, stated here as variations on actual experience. An initiative measure proposes to remove all family farms and residential property from taxation. Another proposes to appropriate half the
state's existing budget to pay persons past the age of 60 a public pension
of $200 a week. A third measure requires all children to attend public
schools only. A fourth declares English to be the state's official language,
to be used in all public transactions. A fifth repeals laws against racial,
religious, or sex discrimination in the sale or rental of housing. A sixth
enacts the death penalty over the protests of religious and other groups
conscientiously opposed to taking life in the people's name. A seventh
prohibits abortions, or it appropriates public funds for abortions over
similar conscientious objections.
The first two, special tax exemptions and appropriations for pensions, are openly designed to redistribute wealth among classes of citizens, the classic battle of contending interests. The third, the attack on
private schools that was invalidated in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,3 ° is
what Oregon in fact did with the initiative in 1922, during a brief affair
with the Ku Klux Klan. It plainly was motivated not by majoritarian
self-interest but by anti-Catholic passion. Is the fourth, the English language measure, similarly an expression of a majority's ethnic prejudices,
or is it a public-spirited concern about the society's future cohesion expressed by a group losing its majority status? In the fifth example, the
self-interest of real estate developers trades on the passion of prejudice to
reverse the elected legislature's deliberate view of the public interest. The
sixth and seventh are philosophical as well as emotional battles in which
economic interests play little role.
Does enactment by plebiscite rather than by a legislature satisfy republican principles in all these examples, in some, or in none? Regretably, the contemporary theorists of republicanism do not discuss initiated
popular legislation, perhaps because it is uncommon in the older states,
or perhaps because the question seems uninteresting as long as courts
apply the same substantive limitations to initiated laws as to all laws. 3
Thus, Pierce struck down Oregon's public school monopoly as a denial of
30. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
31. In a recent symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988),
neither the main authors, Professors Michelman and Sunstein, nor any of ten expert commentators, referred to the phenomenon of direct popular legislation. Nor was it discussed by the
commentators in the Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, supra note 3.
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32
"substantive due process" to private schools. Reitman v. Mulkey
voided California's open housing initiative upon the California court's
finding that it encouraged racially motivated conduct, and Hunter v. Erickson3 3 on similar grounds invalidated a selective referral requirement
limited to open housing ordinances.
But invalidation of some initiatives on substantive grounds says
nothing about legitimate enactment of laws that can survive judicial review of their substance. The Constitution's concern about republican
principles of lawmaking preceded the substantive guarantees of the Bill
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does judicial review of
substance make it irrelevant how laws are made. In other places and
times, regimes that were anything but republican sometimes imposed farreaching national reforms that could not have been achieved by existing
consensual institutions, but the quality of the reforms would not make
their imposition legitimate in an American state.3 4
In republican theory, "deliberation" was central to representative
government.3 5 The word invokes distinct ideas. One is that the mass of
citizens, unlike a representative assembly, would lack the knowledge to
make responsible decisions. Lack of knowledge, however, can be overcome for any one measure in isolation. In Oregon, the supreme court
reviews challenges to the attorney general's phrasing of the captions and
questions that are printed on the ballot, and the state distributes voter
pamphlets, which set out each measure accompanied by statements of
proponents and opponents. Legislators often have no greater knowledge

,32. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); cf.James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)
(sustaining state constitutional amendment extending referendum provisions to public housing
decisions).
33. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
34. A recent article notes that Atatiirk (Mustafa Kemal), who in the 1920s and 1930s
undertook to turn the remnants of Ottoman Turkey into a modern European state, replaced
the Islamic Sharia with a version of the Swiss Civil Code and the Arabic with the Roman
alphabet, secularized the schools, adopted the Western calendar, and extended political rights
to women.
Far more radical than the French or Russian Revolutions, the revolution he
achieved transformed an entire culture, leaving scarcely a single old tenet in place; it
is probably accurate to say that no social metamorphosis in history is so much the
product of the vision of one man....
Scholars generally agree that had Ataturk shown a fastidious regard for democracy as the term is understood in the West his revolution would have been stillborn.
Viorst, A Reporter At Large (Turkey), THE NEW YORKER, June 5, 1989, at 43, 56. See also

Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development, 82
YALE L.J. 1, 16-20, 34-39 (1972).

35. For a contemporary view stressing republican deliberation, see Sunstein, Beyond the
Revival, supra note 4. The function of mediating conflicting interests was largely assumed by
political parties. For a recent discussion, see Fitts, supra note 4.
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and less time to study many bills on which they vote. But more than
personal knowledge distinguishes deliberative action.
Deliberation, Self-Interest, and Collective Passion
Deliberation in representative bodies does not often achieve its ideal
of dispassionate debate and logical persuasion, but it does institutionalize
deliberative processes of choice. Representatives do not react to each bill
in isolation. They see many bills, some repeatedly over a period of several sessions. They relate the effect of a bill or its alternative to other
laws and programs. In or out of committees, they can press proponents
and opponents for answers to questions. They can request legal or fiscal
analyses. They can amend a bill to clarify, to improve, or to compromise. An initiative petition allows none of this.36
There is a deeper difference. Legislators must deal with priorities
other than their own or those of their narrow constituencies. They must
make deliberate choices in allocating scarce resources. There is no give
and take between the sponsors of an initiative measure and those who
must accept it or reject it in toto. Often a representative body chooses
not to override the strongly felt objections of minority opinion or interests in order to effect the wishes of the popular majority. The very unresponsiveness that outraged the majoritarian populists can be the essence
of deliberate decision.
Unlike the voter who is given a menu of measures on the ballot, a
legislator (at least in states like Oregon) cannot vote anonymously for or
against a few bills and skip the rest; the legislator must take a stand on
each bill that reaches the floor. Even under the interest group model of
public policy, representatives are expected to rationalize their acts as
serving some interest beyond their private self-interests. Citizens voting
on an initiative measure need not do so. Representatives as lawmakers
can have a conflict of interest; citizens as lawmakers cannot. To the contrary, the plebiscite is defended as the truest measure of aggregate selfinterest; neither theory nor practice expects voters to subordinate their
perceived self-interest in voting on ballot measures. The anonymous
plebiscite may be the ultimate in democracy, as the 19th century populists saw it, but even with the best access to information, it remains the
antithesis of deliberative, "republican" lawmaking.
36. Until 1966, the California Constitution allowed initiative petitions to propose draft
legislation to the legislature before it was referred to the voters. If the legislature adopted an
alternative version, both versions would be referred. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1, el. 3 (1849)
(repealed 1966).
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Professor Eule proposes to tame that antithesis within the larger system of checks and balances, that is to say, by the courts, because enactment by direct legislation has excluded the legislature and the governor.
He proposes tighter judicial scrutiny of initiated measures, rather than
giving them intuitively greater deference as the authentic expression of
majority will.3 7 But scrutiny for what flaws? The prescription for tighter
scrutiny must relate to the diagnosis. Professor Eule, like others, believes
that initiative measures are especially vulnerable to unequally financed,
one-sided, and misleading propaganda. Perhaps so, but I do not understand him to invite courts to invalidate a successful initiative on a finding
that this has occurred. Yet there is little logic in proposing a "harder
look" at initiated laws for violations of the same substantive constraints
that, if found to exist, also would invalidate conventional legislation.
The suggestion of heightened judicial scrutiny of initiated laws for invasions of liberty, equality, or property rights carries the unfortunate implication of relatively lower scrutiny of otherwise identical conventional
laws. That cannot be defended if violation of a guaranteed right is the
flaw in issue.
Whether an initiative measure squares with republicanism cannot
hinge on whether the measure invades constitutional rights. The question, to repeat, is whether some measures may be invalid if taken by direct plebiscites that would be valid if enacted by a representative
legislature. If the answer is yes, the difference must lie in the process of
enactment. The measure must be impeached on grounds on which the
drafters in 1787 chose a republican over a purely majoritarian form of
government: deliberation, interest, and passion. These are not easy tests
to apply. But they are not more obscure than what the Supreme Court
has made of equality, "privacy," and "substantive due process."
Deliberation in the initiative process would be enhanced if a proposed measure, after receiving the necessary signatures, were required to
be laid before one regular session of the legislature before being placed on
the ballot only if the legislature did not act; or if an initiative measure
had to receive majorities in two successive elections.3" Lacking these
safeguards against hasty, slipshod, and ill-considered action, courts can
recognize the different roles of the common requirements governing the
title and "single subject" of proposals in legislative bills and in initiative
measures. Legislators may show a weakness for logrolling and a huck37. Note, The Use of Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation ofPopularly EnactedLegislation,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1989).
38. See the pre-1966 provision of the California Constitution, art. IV, § 1, cl. 3 (1848)
(repealed 1966).
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ster's puffery in labeling their products, but legislators are less likely than
voters to be misled when, for instance, "victims' rights" becomes a wrapper for a package of pro-prosecution changes in trial procedure.3 9
Beyond testing for procedural failure of information on which to
deliberate, testing whether a measure short-circuited the role of deliberation in mediating private "interests" is not categorically impossible.
Some initiative measures are evident appeals to the voters' self-interest,
sometimes against an opposing private interest, sometimes against a
more diffused target like the tax system. A classic example of the former
would be an initiative for the kind of debt moratorium that (when enacted by the Minnesota Legislature) was sustained against a contract
clause challenge in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell.4°
Many other initiatives pursue non-economic goals that may be the special interest of their sponsors but are not the collisions of economic class
interests that republicanism was designed to mediate. The distinction is
not beyond judicial capacity. When an environmental or penal initiative
disregards countervailing costs that a legislature would refuse to impose,
the defect is not that the initiative appeals directly to a majoritarian "interest." A nonself-serving initiative's defect, however, may be not
majoritarian "interest" but majoritarian "passion."
"Passion," to Enlightenment theorists like David Hume and "Publius," meant the wellsprings of individual action, such as pride and ambition for honor and fame, as well as of collective action.4 1 But only
collective, not individual, passion could create a majoritarian "faction,"
in Madison's term. Collective passion would differ from cumulated selfinterest; it might be ethnic or religious (sectarian, Madison might say),4 2
or it might be a patriotic fervor against outsiders, "enemies." Even rep39. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982); cf.
State ex rel Fidanque v. Paulus, 297 Or. 711, 719, 688 P.2d 1303, 1308 (1984) (Linde, J.,
dissenting) (initiative measures violative of the single subject requirement should be subject to
attack at various stages of the approval process).
40. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). I doubt that the majority, in this 5-4 decision, would have been
as ready to find that the Minnesota moratorium law's declaration of an "emergency" gave
"occasion for the exercise of the reserved power of the State to protect the vital interests of the
community," and that the "legislation was not for the mere advantage of individuals but for
the protection of a basic interest of society," if the law had been enacted by initiative petition
and popular plebiscite rather than by the Minnesota legislature and governor.
41. G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 83-86, 190-92 (1981). The Federalist's dichotomy is said to be one of "passion" and "reason." Kahn, Reason and Will in the
Origins of American Constitutionalism, 98 YALE L.J. 449, 459 (1989).
42. "A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the confederacy;
but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils
against any danger from that source ... " THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 61-62 (J. Madison) (P.
Ford ed. 1898).
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resentative institutions are feeble dikes when such passions are fannedfor instance, by a William Randolph Hearst, as Speaker Thomas Reed
learned.4 3 But would the nation's government be "republican," as the
Constitution uses the term, if war on Spain (or on Iran, in 1979) could be
declared by a popular majority voting on an initiative petition? If this
would not be "republican," then what of a state's initiative to ban the
German language as unpatriotic,' or perhaps a measure to intern Japanese-Americans?
If direct popular enactment of such passions into law should be
questionable under the Guarantee Clause, that issue was not made irrelevant when the Fourteenth Amendment later offered the courts other rubrics to review measures for substance rather than for process. Testing
an initiative measure for "passion," as well as for "interest," implies
deeper inquiry into the measure's origins, background, and contemporaneous expressions of public opinion than merely substituting the text of
voters' pamphlets and explanatory ballot statements for conventional legislative history.
Conclusion
To summarize: Any theory of "republicanism" is incomplete that
does not consider the Guarantee Clause or does not account for the
anomalous position of state lawmaking by plebiscites without participation by the state's representative institutions, specifically its legislature.
The United States Constitution requires each state to maintain a republican form of government. The Constitution also obliges each state's governmental institutions, particularly under Article VI its judges, to honor
that requirement, which means that they must interpret it when necessary. Because the Supreme Court has held that within the federal government the determination is allocated to the political branches, such a
determination (for instance in approving a state's constitution at the time
of admission) would bind a state court; but without it, the court must
interpret the guarantee of a "republican form of government" as best it
can.4" State courts in Kansas and Oregon have done so.
43. See B. TUCHMAN, THE PROUD TOWER 145-62 (1966).

44. The legislation invalidated in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) on substantive
due process grounds was not an initiative measure.
45. For instance, in 1907, Congress admitted Oklahoma's senators and representatives
although Oklahoma's constitution provided for the initiative and referendum lawmaking system. See Kiernan v. Portland, 57 Or. 454, 470, 111 P. 379, 404 (1910). Is the decision of one
Congress to admit a state legally binding authority on the constitutional question for another
state, beyond showing that the admitted state's structure is not per se nonrepublican?
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Whether lawmaking by statewide plebiscite upon an initiative petition, bypassing the legislature and governor, is "republican" remains an
open question. One possible answer is that this method of state legislation may or may not be republican, depending on the characteristics of
the measure or the processes of enactment. When the experiment with
initiative legislation was newly adopted at the turn of the century, the
Oregon Supreme Court held that its existence did not contravene the
Guarantee Clause. The state's other governmental institutions remained
as republican as before. That was before the state had experience with
the effects of the system on those other institutions.
Although the question was and is open to debate, a state court may
now find it too difficult to hold that a system of statewide plebiscitary
lawmaking without participation by any representative officials is
nonrepublican in whatever form and for whatever purpose. a6 It is easier
to proceed as if the United States Supreme Court's stance meant the contrary, that the Guarantee Clause imposes no constraints on initiative legislation in any form or for any purpose, or that a state court may not
consider a challenge under the Guarantee Clause. But the Supreme
Court has not said that. Once it is recognized that a state's compliance
with its obligation to maintain a republican form of government is justiciable in the state's courts, regardless of who deals with that question in
Washington, D.C., a state court might consider whether a particular initiative process or a particular measure is compatible with republican lawmaking, if the issue were presented. I am not aware of a case where such
an argument was made.
It is not an argument to be made lightly. If thrown in desperation
into a losing brief, it is likely to result only in an adverse precedent for
later cases. In the foregoing comments, I have tried only to suggest possible lines of inquiry into the background of the republicanism that the
drafters of the Constitution, particularly the successful Federalists, intended to preserve. A differentiated approach to testing statewide direct
lawmaking requires examination of their ideas of deliberation and their
fear of unmediated short-run majoritarian passions and self-interest. It
requires litigants to demonstrate that a particular measure was enacted
from such motives. The question deserves whatever help scholarly amici
curiae like Professor Eule and the theorists of republicanism can give us.

46. In fact, disputes over whether a measure is "legislative" or "administrative" are frequently litigated. See State ex rel Allen v. Martin, 255 Or. 401, 405-07, 465 P.2d 228, 230-31
(1970); Tillamook P.U.D. v. Coates, 174 Or. 476, 149 P.2d 558 (1944).

